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Abstract 
 
The so-called “special relationship” has been a fixture of international relations since at least 1940, 
but it seemed of declining significance during the 1960s and 1970s. It has nevertheless been re-
vived, even refounded, since then; and it has served as the strategic base on which a new Anglo-
American vision of the world has been articulated. At the core of the new connection, and the 
vision to which it gave rise, is a strong preference for the market and a set of foreign and domes-
tic policies that privilege markets and see their expansion as critical to peace, prosperity and the 
expansion of democracy. This essay examines the origins of this new paradigm as a response to a 
set of interrelated crises in the 1970s, its elaboration and application during the 1980s under Rea-
gan and Thatcher, its curious history since the end of the Cold War, and the way it evolved into 
the failed policies of the post-9/11 era. 
 
 
   The “special relationship”: old and new, imagined and real 
 
  Enthusiasts for the “special relationship” would seem to be uniquely susceptible 
to delusional thinking.1 In the UK there is the delusion that the connection compensates 
for the loss of empire and makes Britain great despite it. On the American side there is 
the parallel belief that by “succeeding John Bull” as the world’s dominant power, the 
U.S. has taken over a civilizing mission that renders its hegemony more legitimate, more 
benign and more tasteful. Visions of Anglo-American cooperation almost inevitably 
build on a sense of racial pride that is not only delusional, but also quite unappealing to 
those left out, and they are typically accompanied by a marked preference for Conserva-
tive politics. The main delusion held by proponents of the alliance is, of course, the idea 
that it matters greatly to both parties and to the world. Again and again, the actions of 
both governments have demonstrated that this is not quite true, that national interests 
can and do drive the two allies apart and that, when they act together, cooperation pre-
supposes common interests. There are also the enduring British conceit that they have 
and should have more influence on the U.S. than they in fact have and the recurring 
American tendency to forget the alliance until they need British support for some ven-
ture where unilateral action is inappropriate. Politicians and diplomats regularly feed 
the delusions embedded in the connection while acknowledging in practice the less sen-
timental realities that lie beneath the rhetoric. 
 
  Inevitably, then, excessive talk of the “special relationship” elicits irritation, bore-
dom, ridicule and confusion in roughly equal measure. When invoked by British and 
American politicians it can signify anything from a common language and cultural con-
nectedness to a battle-tested military alliance. To many on the left in both countries it 
represents imperialism pure and simple. In Britain it appeals mainly to the mainstream, 
to judicious and worldly-wise leaders who see it as a means of augmenting Britain’s in-
fluence in an era of diminished power. While it is typically opposed by the left, it is also 
opposed by those on the right who see America as the enemy of Britain’s former empire 
and the usurper of its global role. In America politicians and diplomats of the realist per-
suasion scarcely think of it, except at those moments when the U.S. wants to do some-
thing like fight a war, make peace, construct an alliance or fight for a line in an interna-
tional organization – the stuff of international relations on a daily basis – and find they 
could use a reliable ally. The “special relationship’s” serious enthusiasts in the U.S. tend 
to be, if not quite cranks, at least rather quaint Anglophiles who regularly gather to-
gether to celebrate some Churchill anniversary or to applaud Mrs. Thatcher. To the 
French, les Anglo-Saxons, as Chirac explained during the failed campaign to ratify the EU 
constitution, represent the crass culture of the marketplace and as such threaten civili-
sation in France and elsewhere. 
                                                 
1Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Center for European and Mediterranean Studies, New 
York University, October 12, 2007; at the Bristol Institute for Public Affairs and the Political Studies Asso-
ciation Labour Movements Group Conference, Department of Politics, University of Bristol, May 24, 
2007; and at the Seminar on Contemporary British History, Institute of Historical Research, University of 
London, January 24, 2007. I am grateful to the organizers of these events and to the participants, who in-
variably asked probing questions that invariably helped with subsequent iterations of the argument better. I 
profited as well from readings of old and new versions of this essay by John Young, John Baylis, John 
Dumbrel, Andrew Gamble, David Reynolds, Michael Hunt, Seth Jacobs, Jim Shoch and Peter Hall. With 
this much help, it should be obvious that any remaining mistakes and misconceptions are mine alone.  
  Given all this contradiction, antipathy and muddle-headedness, is there any use-
ful purpose to be served by taking seriously, and actually studying, the Anglo-American 
alliance? The assumption of this essay is that there is, and for reasons both historical and 
contemporary. Historically, the Anglo-American connection has been critical to the ma-
jor geopolitical events of the twentieth century and, in particular, to the world order that 
emerged after 1945. The contemporary importance of the link stems from the role the al-
liance played in the very last stages of the Cold War and in the effort to construct a post-
Cold-War world order. The older history, up through the 1960s, is pretty well-known 
and documented; more recent events are not. The aim of this paper is to begin to analyze 
the latest phase in the long history of the “special relationship” and to explain its un-
usual importance. 
 
  More specifically, it will be argued that the Anglo-American alliance, which 
seemed very much past its useful life in the 1970s, was reconstructed on a new basis in 
the 1980s. The effect was to put the two allies in a position to offer a vision of how to re-
shape states, societies and the international order in the wake of the fall of communism. 
Much of what has happened since has been a matter of its supporters working out the 
implications of that vision or, as often as not, its opponents resisting it. Central to the re-
constructed “special relationship” and to the shared Anglo-American vision of the 
world after the Cold War was the market, which was seen as the promoter and guaran-
tor of peace and democracy and the expansion of which was proposed as the precondi-
tion of growth and prosperity. It was thus the turn to the market in the 1980s, a turn 
prompted by a set of interlocked political and economic crises that confronted both Brit-
ain and America in the 1970s, which allowed for a reassertion of the alliance and which 
informed subsequent efforts to reshape the world.     
 
  Assessing the Anglo-American connection is therefore more important, but also 
more complicated, than it might at first appear. Looked at as merely an alliance, of 
course, it is pretty straightforward. The interests of the two states have largely coincided 
during the twentieth century and so they have allied repeatedly – in two world wars, in 
the Cold War, and even during the post-Cold-War era. The alliance was of course never 
untroubled: it has been marked by irritation and misunderstanding and, more impor-
tantly, interests have at times diverged. If the resulting long-term relationship has been 
“special,” it has been special primarily because of a fundamental convergence of inter-
ests. If it has looked more special than that, it is because the two states and societies have 
so much more in common than is the case with most other countries and because politi-
cal leaders, British leaders in particular, have chosen to overstate these commonalities in 
the hope that the American alliance will give Britain more clout than it would otherwise 
wield. None of this is surprising. 
 
  Looked at differently, as Anglo-American power and its accompanying vision 
for how the world should work, the connection looks both more important and much 
more complex. It can be argued that the world as we know it is in critical respects a 
product of the “special relationship,” the Anglo-American alliance. Britain and the 
United States combined to confront and overcome fascism and became the core of the 
broader united front that defeated the Nazis, the Japanese and their allies. The alliance 
was recast in the early years of the Cold War and again served as the center for the pro-
tracted effort to thwart and contain the Soviets, their clients and supporters. Other states 
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took part in both efforts, but the Anglo-America alliance was the foundation upon which 
these global coalitions were built. Both projects therefore came largely to embody Anglo-
American visions of world order, of how the world economy should be run, and of the 
sorts of states and societies that would be nurtured within these successive coalitions. 
Not that these visions prevailed unaltered, but the world they helped to create was 
closer to Anglo-American practice and principles than to any alternative.  
 
  Even more remarkable, and hence the focus of this paper, is the fact that Britain 
and the United States effectively extended their alliance through the end of the Cold 
War. For that reason, their largely shared vision has been critical in shaping the post-
Cold-War era. Their latest project has been portrayed as an effort to create a new global 
hegemony or a new kind of empire. Whether this characterization is right or wrong, and 
whether the ambition it describes succeeds or fails, a venture of such magnitude requires 
a different kind of analysis than the study of even a very close and enduring alliance.2 
 
  The strategy employed here will be to utilize the study of the Anglo-American 
connection, and its evolution, as a means of understanding a larger set of questions 
about its objectives, consequences and historic import. Attention will be focused on the 
most recent phase of the relationship, partly because it is less studied but mainly be-
cause its consequences have been in no small measure responsible for the present dis-
order and uncertainty in international relations. This phase begins, it will be argued, 
with the foundering of the relationship in the 1970s, when both countries experienced a 
series of reversals and when their connection seemed especially unhelpful. But because 
the U.S. and the UK responded in similar fashion to these challenges, the basis was laid 
for reestablishing the relationship during the 1980s. The story continues through the end 
of the Cold War and the subsequent effort to delineate the shape of a new world order 
based on a more globalized economy. It has ended up in Iraq. 
 
                                                 
2To illustrate the difference in approaches, one can consider the very distinct literatures and sour-
ces that would be drawn upon for these very different analytical purposes. Treating the connec-
tion as an alliance would mean reviewing and updated a long tradition of diplomatic history and 
also teasing out insights and hypotheses from theoretical work on alliances – e.g., Stephen Walt’s 
The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) and Taming American Power: The 
Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2006); and the many scholars with whom he 
engages. (For a more up-to-date inventory and a skeptical stance, see Michael Beeson, “The De-
clining Theoretical and Practical Utility of ‘Bandwagoning’: American Hegemony in the Age of 
Terror,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, IX,4 [2007]: 618-635.) Viewing it in 
terms of hegemony and empire would involve an engagement with theoretical literature on hege-
monic powers – most famously Robert Keohane, After hegemony:  cooperation and discord in the 
world political economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and his critics and predeces-
sors -- and their role in creating and managing world order, as well as the enormous scholarly 
output on the long history of empire (see below). Just how different the resulting analyses would 
look can perhaps be grasped by comparing two recent and very good books. One, Kathleen 
Burk’s Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America (London: Little, Brown, 2007), stud-
ies Britain and America as a relationship; another, Walter Russell Mead’s God and Gold: Britain, 
America, and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007), is unconcerned with the 
details of the alliance and focuses on its impact for the world. 
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  The key to understanding this recent history is to be found in an examination of 
the principles on which the connection was reasserted. Three terms – markets, rights and 
power – best summarize these principles, for at the core of this reshaping was neoliber-
alism, the privileging of markets and market mechanisms in domestic and foreign pol-
icy, in politics as well as in economics. It was an outlook and a policy framework whose 
foreign and domestic aspects were meant to reinforce one another and to help to create 
the very reality whose interests it promoted and whose virtues it celebrated. The promo-
tion of markets was accompanied by a rhetorical commitment to human rights that, at 
least occasionally, became more than rhetoric. The military posture of the U.S., and with 
it that of the UK, was also redefined. This new ensemble of policies was not only new; 
equally important, it was a formula that appeared to meet with spectacular success with 
the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. The effect was to ratify the 
new policy orientation, to make it more explicit and its advocates more self-confident, 
and to guarantee that it became deeply embedded in the political cultures and practices 
of the two nations and, to a considerable extent, in international institutions as well in 
the post-Cold-War era. 
 
  The new framework informing American and British policy was not invented all 
at once, and its components emerged piecemeal during the late 1970s and 1980s.3 It in-
volved significant departures in three key areas of policy: 
 
 1.  The embrace of the market. A preference for markets over politics and the state 
and the forced opening of markets at home and abroad became a major goal for both 
countries. This meant a radical turning away from Keynesian policies of demand 
management by national governments and from statist economic policies and to-
wards world markets, towards policies designed to free up the movement of goods 
and services, capital and even people, and towards growth through exports. 
 
 2.  A post-imperial military strategy. There was a resolve to maintain, or even en-
hance, the military superiority of the U.S. and its most reliable ally, by continued 
reliance on nuclear weapons and technologically sophisticated conventional weap-
ons. This predominance would be coupled, however, with what might be called a 
“post-imperial” strategy that dictated a very cautious stance on the exercise of mili-
tary force. This new position stemmed from the recognition that nuclear war was 
virtually unthinkable and that the U.S. and its allies could not prevail militarily in 
wars of national liberation such as Vietnam. What remained possible were minor, 
peripheral and harassing operations against the Soviet Union and its clients.4 
 
 3.    The (selective) rediscovery of human rights and the promotion of democracy. 
The U.S.  and the U.K. adopted a new emphasis on human rights and democracy 
and a novel insistence on the market as the precondition and guarantor of democ-
racy. 
                                                 
3David Harvey locates the turning point more precisely in 1978-80. See his A Brief History of Neo-
liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
4See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). These minor, peripheral conflicts were of course 
anything but minor to those closely involved. 
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Preparing the Liberal Turn 
 
  To argue that liberalism – markets, rights, democracy promotion, and military re-
straint – has inspired British and American foreign policy in recent decades may seem 
counterintuitive, or even perverse, at a moment when the most salient feature of interna-
tional relations would seem to be the turn to military force, and its more or less unilat-
eral use, and when the term most often used to describe the situation is empire or some 
rough equivalent. It is not unreasonable to speak of American power and the Anglo-
American alliance in imperial terms – as empire, hyper-puissance, Űberpower, colossus, 
neocolonialism, or the slightly less threatening hegemon.5 But however alluring and 
evocative these metaphors, they are all to some extent ahistorical, for they fail to recog-
nize that what the U.S. and UK have sought to exercise is a distinctly post-imperial and 
liberal hegemony, and that while U.S. or Anglo-American military power is a part of this 
project, the military side is but one feature of its predominance.6 This neoliberal policy 
                                                 
5See, for example, Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 
2004); Hubert Védrine, Face à l’hyper-puissance (Paris: Fayard, 2003); and Josef Joffe, Überpower:  
The Imperial Temptation of American (New York: Norton, 2006). Madeleine Albright’s phrase “the 
indispensable nation” sounds less threatening, but to outsiders and critics is perhaps no more at-
tractive.  
6The argument about whether to regard the US as an empire is of course a recurring one. The 
point of view adopted here is that, while the term captures many aspects of the American past, it 
also obscures the very real difference between that experience and what empire looked like else-
where. This point was made forcefully some years ago in the contributions to Wolfgang Momm-
sen and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: 
Allen & Unwin, for the German Historical Institute), especially in the essays by Klaus Schwabel 
on the United States and Ronald Robinson on the “excentric idea of imperialism.” See also Tony 
Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the late-industrializing world 
since 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For a useful review of the debate 
about the new American imperialism, if such it is, see Michael Cox, “Empire by Denial: the 
strange case of the United States,” International Affairs LXXXI,1 (January, 2005): 15-30; and also the 
thoughtful contributions to the “Forum on the American Empire” in the Review of International 
Studies XXX,4 (2004): Cox, “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine”: 585-608; G. John Iken-
berry, “Liberalism and Empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age”: 609-630; and 
Michael Mann, “The first failed empire of the 21st century”: 631-653. To simplify three complex 
arguments, Cox finds it useful to regard the United States as an imperial power, Ikenberry thinks 
it is not, and Mann feels that, whatever American leaders may wish, empire in the current era of 
nation-states and anticolonialism is impossible. The term has become ubiquitous in contemporary 
discourse primarily because it is embraced by both advocates and critics of American empire – 
see, for example, Ferguson, Colossus, who wants more of it and fewer apologies; Michael Igna-
tieff, Empire Lite (London: Vintage, 2003), who regrets its necessity and agonizes over its tactics; 
Andrew Bacevich, America’s Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002) who want it to be more enlightened and nuanced; and Rich-
ard Falk, The Decline of World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2004), 
who believes it portends a “global fascism” and so wants none of it. It is of course unobjection-
able to use the term as a metaphor for what is certainly a preponderance of power but, as an ana-
lytical term, it is seriously lacking in precision and historical accuracy, as Eric Hobsbawm – no 
friend of empire or U.S. hegemony – has recently pointed out. See Hobsbawm, “Why America’s 
Hegemony Differs from Britain’s Empire,” Massey Lectures on “American Empire in Global Per-
spective,” Harvard University, October 19, 2005, reprinted in Globalization, Democracy and Terror-
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framework, moreover, was not an inheritance or a continuation of past imperial or neo-
colonial policies. It had antecedents, to be sure, but in historical terms it represented a 
clear and deliberate repudiation of the policies followed by both Britain and the United 
States, in alliance and separately, in the first quarter century after the Second World 
War.7 It was a departure that was prompted by cumulative and widely perceived fail-
ures during the 1970s, in economic policy and in foreign relations, and that in conse-
quence sought to reverse the established policy paradigm. 
 
  The argument offered here depends crucially therefore on a particular reading of 
the origins of this new approach. In the beginning, then, were the multiple crises of the 
1970s, when Britain’s clout as a world power was becoming a memory, when America’s 
postwar power confronted unprecedented challenges, and when the alliance between 
the two countries was seriously strained. Rough superpower parity in nuclear weapons, 
defeat in Indochina, and the end of the postwar boom made U.S. preponderance less 
overwhelming and effective. The Watergate scandal and its ramifications, moreover, 
precluded an effective response to these challenges and put an end to the emerging “im-
perial presidency.” America’s ability to project power abroad and to control its allies had 
also weakened markedly, as its isolation during the 1973 Arab-Israel War and subse-
quent oil boycott demonstrated, and as the Helsinki Final Act, which amounted to a de 
facto acquiescence to the “Brezhnev doctrine” and thus to Soviet supremacy in eastern 
Europe, would register in more formal terms in 1975. On the other side Britain’s earlier 
choices to withdraw its forces “east of Suez” and to join the Common Market signaled 
the end of even the pretension that on its own Britain’s residual world role could be the 
basis for anything more than gestures of goodwill.8 If any doubts remained on the issue, 
they were utterly dissipated by the need to seek a loan from the IMF in the fall of 1976 
and in what was perceived to be a pervasive crisis of “governability.”9 
                                                                                                                                                 
ism (London: Little, Brown, 2007), pp. 49-73. See, in addition, Charles Maier, Among Empires: 
American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Mi-
chael Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United states Gained and Wielded Global Dominance 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); and also Bruce Cummings, “Still the 
American Century,” in Michael Cox, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., The Interregnum: Controver-
sies in World Politics, 1989-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 271-299. 
Maier and Hunt prefer the term ascendancy, Cummings “liberal hegemony.” For a useful collec-
tion of views on empire and the American experience, see Bacevich, ed., The Imperial Tense: Pros-
pects and Problems of American Empire (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2003); and, for a still broader view, John 
Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007).  
7Britain was, after all, the country that more or less invented free trade and supported it longest; 
in the United States, the expansion of markets has long been an objective of foreign policy. On the 
former, see Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); on the 
latter, see the classic text – William Appelman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959). 
8Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (London: Mac-
millan, 1998); Helen Parr, “Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British 
Foreign Policy, 1964-67,” Contemporary British History XX,3 (September, 2006): 403-421; John 
Young, “Britain and Vietnam,” Cold War History II, 3 (April, 2002). 
9For a very thoughtful review of the contentious question of whether Britain was “ungovern-
able,” see Sam Beer, Britain against Itself: the political contradictions of collectivism (New York: Nor-
ton, 1982). 
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  The parallel crises of the U.S. and the U.K. were accompanied by a fraying of the 
alliance. By the mid-1970s the “special relationship” appeared spent. Indeed, as late as 
1986 a major study of the alliance conceded that “since the 1970s Anglo-American rela-
tions, considered entirely by themselves, have ceased to be very important or very inter-
esting.”10 The atrophy of the Anglo-American alliance in the 1960s and 1970s was in part 
a natural, and reasonably amicable, disengagement from a relationship that had been 
unusually intimate but whose original raison d’être no longer existed. The threat from 
Germany that had brought the alliance into existence was overcome by 1945; and the 
most threatening era of Cold War rivalry had long passed by the 1970s. In consequence, 
the 1960s and early 1970s had seen a general loosening of the blocs on both sides of the 
Cold War, and the policy of “détente” reduced superpower tensions further and led to 
still greater fragmentation. The bipolar world of the Cold War seemed about to be re-
placed by a multipolar world order.  
 
  There was also, however, a genuine estrangement between Britain and America. 
Neither side ever quite got over Suez and, despite efforts at the top to patch things up, 
especially over nuclear policy, British and American leaders drifted further apart during 
Vietnam. Johnson felt very much let down over the lack of British support. Nixon and 
Kissinger, on the other hand, thought on a scale far grander than the Anglo-American al-
liance and their shared sense of Realpolitik would mean that neither invested as much 
faith in the Anglo-American connection as had earlier American leaders. Edward Heath 
would reciprocate, and increasingly came to define Britain’s future in European terms. 
As Kissinger put it, under Heath, “The relationship never flourished.”11 The underlying 
                                                 
10See David Watt, “Introduction: the Anglo-American Relationship,” in Hedley Bull and Wm. 
Roger Louis, eds., The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1986), p. 13, where he argues that “since the 1970s Anglo-American relations, considered en-
tirely by themselves, have ceased to be very important or very interesting.” Other contributors to 
this, at the time more or less definitive, volume were somewhat less dismissive, but the general 
sense was that the heyday of the relationship was long past. For other assessments, see David 
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (London: Long-
man, 2000); D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Baylis, Anglo-American defence relations: the special 
relationship (London: Macmillan, 1984); Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twen-
tieth Century (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998); John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American 
Relations in the Cold War and After (New York: St. Martin’s, 2001); Alex Danchev, On Specialness: 
Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998); John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More – 
Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994); Alan Dob-
son, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and De-
cline of Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995); G. R. Urban, Diplomacy and Illusion at the Court of 
Margaret Thatcher (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996);) Andrew Williams, Failed Imaginations? The Anglo-
American new world order from Wilson to Bush, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2007); and, of course, Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American 
Relationship (New York: Nation Books, 2004). See also Andrew Gamble, “The Anglo-American 
Hegemony: From Greater Britain to the Anglosphere” (2006), for a recent treatment that makes an 
argument not unlike that outlined here. For a celebratory account, see Andrew Roberts, A History 
of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900 (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). For more judicious if 
also very broad accounts, see Mead, God and Gold; and Burk, Old World, New World. 
11Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), p. 933. 
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tensions would surface over the Arab-Israeli War in 1973; and the lack of a shared re-
sponse to the Arab oil boycott pushed the two states still further apart. British policy-
makers quickly realized, of course, that in a world of scarce resources and few allies the 
alliance with the U.S. was potentially critical, and so resolved to rebuild it. But what had 
they to offer when they had already retreated from their global role, when their clout 
within Europe was minimal and when the nation’s economy seemed in terminal de-
cline? Not much. When the head of the North American Department in the Foreign Of-
fice toured the U.S. in October 1975, therefore, he “found little trace in the USA generally 
of a sense of special relationship with Britain…”12 America’s disinclination to soften the 
terms of the IMF loan in 1976 would show soon enough and very clearly just what it 
meant to get on the wrong side of the world’s superpower and its leading economic 
power.13 
 
  In fact, British leaders could do very little not only because of Britain’s weakness 
but also because the U.S. was absorbed in its own set of crises.14 Kissinger was of course 
keenly aware of America’s isolation in the mid-1970s and established surprisingly good 
relations with his counterparts, Jim Callaghan and then Tony Crosland.15 It mattered lit-
tle. Callaghan would continue the effort after Kissinger’s departure and as Prime Minis-
ter would visit Carter in March, 1977, eager “to establish his own special relationship”; 
and the two made gestures aimed at restoring the relationship – with Brzezinski looking 
on warily. But doing so was not a top priority and progress was minimal, for both gov-
ernments were seriously distracted and forced to focus on matters of domestic economic 
management.16 The Carter administration was beset at home and abroad: it had simul-
taneously to deal with the faltering of détente, the Iranian revolution and the subsequent 
                                                 
12Report of Derek Thomas on his visit to U.S., October 28, 1975, TNA, FCO82/495. 
13See Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, ’Goodbye, Great Britain’: The 1976 IMF Crisis (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
14British leaders have long been very aware of the need to prove their worth to their American 
ally. As Oliver Franks observed in 1995, “In the Anglo-American relationship British policy has to 
pass the test: can the British deliver?” Franks, Britain and the Tide of World Affairs (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), cited in Alex Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘spe-
cial relationship’ in historical perspective,” Review of International Studies XXXIII (2007): 189. 
Franks was British Ambassador to the United States from 1948 to 1952. Sir Nicholas Henderson, 
long-time diplomat and British Ambassador to the U.S. during 1979-92, similarly explained in a 
1998 interview that, “There’s always this question, ‘Is Britain which is the much weaker power, 
putting enough into the kitty to make the relationship worthwhile for the Americans?’” See tran-
script of interview, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, Cambridge, DOHP32. Britain’s lack of influence with the U.S. at various mo-
ments was clearly a function of its perceived weakness overall. See also, for the situation in the 
mid-1970s, Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1983), p. 465. 
15See various files on meetings and communications between Kissinger, Callaghan and Crosland 
in The National Archives, FCO82/662, FCO82/664-668, and esp. FCO82/668. Kissinger would give a 
speech at Chatham House on May 10, 1982, “Reflections on a Partnership: British and American 
Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy,” in which he claimed that “By 1976, James Callaghan and 
Anthony Crosland has restored the traditional close relationship…” A copy of the speech can be 
found in the Callaghan Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Box 148.  
16David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991),  p. 282. 
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hostage crisis, while another round of oil price increases wreaked havoc with policies 
designed to restrain inflation and restore growth. 
 
  Difficulties in external policy were clearly magnified and rendered more intracta-
ble because they coincided with the end of postwar capitalism’s “golden age,” which 
had done so much to enhance America’s predominant role and to cushion the impact of 
the end of empire for the U.K. This unhappy conjuncture – of short-term difficulties 
superimposed on a long-term shift in economic prospects and conditions of economic 
growth – seemed to require a break not only from foreign policies and military strategies 
that were now seen to have become counterproductive but also from the social compro-
mises and economic policies that had dominated postwar domestic politics. The crises of 
the early and mid-1970s were such as to traumatize political elites and unsettle elector-
ates and to push both to query established beliefs and to repudiate the reigning conven-
tional wisdom on public policy.17 The consequence was a rejection not simply of particu-
lar leaders or of specific policy choices, foreign and domestic, but of the entire package 
of economic policies that had proved so effective during the first quarter century after 
the war. The “postwar settlement” – typically a mix of Keynesian economic policy and 
more extensive welfare commitments – was subject to increasingly harsh criticism from 
left and right, and its policy prescriptions no longer met with widespread assent.18 It 
was a context in which traditions, even those of recent vintage, mattered negatively, as 
something to be avoided, overcome and transcended.19   
                                                
 
  Inevitably, alternatives to failed policies emerged only after a period of trial and 
error, confusion and further failure. Such was the shared fate of the governments whose 
bad luck it was to inherit these crises: the Labour governments of 1974-79 in Britain and 
the administration led by Jimmy Carter in the U.S. The Labour government was trapped 
 
17As David Calleo has argued, “The recession of 1974 and 1975 was far and away the most severe 
setback suffered by the American economy since the Second World War.” See Calleo, “Since 
1961: American Power in a New World Economy,” in W. H. Backer and S.F. Wells, eds., Econom-
ics and World Power: An assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789 (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1984), pp. 427-28. 
18See Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
19See Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-
making in Britain,” Comparative Politics XXV,3 (April, 1993): 275-296, for a description of how the 
Keynesian paradigm was eroded in Britain during the 1970s and replaced with something very 
different. A comparable shift occurred in the U.S. See James Shoch, “”Bringing Public Opinion 
and Electoral Politcs Back In: Explaining the Fate of ‘Clintonomics’ and Its Contemporary Rele-
vance,” Politics and Society XXXVI,1 (March, 2008): 1-42, on the paradigm shift and its long-term 
effects in constraining political choice; but see also the essays in W. Elliot Brownlie and Hugh D. 
Graham, eds., The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies (Lawrence KS: Uni-
versity of Kansas Press, 2003), for a more ambivalent view. The fact that Britain and the United 
States turned at more or less the same time in a similar direction is often attributed to their shared 
and deeply-rooted preference for markets over the state. The argument here is that, while the 
turn may have had long-term antecedents, it was largely a reaction to a particular, and also 
shared, set of challenges. For a similar argument, see Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: 
The Rise of Neoliberal Policies in Britain, France, Germany and the United States (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). Cf. also Stephen Gill, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Discipli-
nary Neoliberalism,” Millennium XXIV,3 (1995): 399-423. 
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in what has been labeled a “post-imperial crisis,” but it was government’s demonstrated 
inability to deal with this crisis that revealed truly systemic flaws and weaknesses in 
Britain’s domestic economy, in its position in the international economy, and in the or-
thodoxies guiding domestic and foreign policy.20 Labour was of course not alone in fail-
ing to solve the nation’s economic problems. Indeed, the experience of the Heath ad-
ministration and the “troubles” of the early 1970s had already produced an intense pes-
simism among political elites. In late 1974, for example, the head of the Foreign Office 
Planning Staff had written a memo entitled “Surviving the Seventies.” “Over the next 
few years,” he asserted, “our opportunities are likely to be limited. Our main problem 
will be our own survival: as an economically viable country; as an independent country; 
as the United Kingdom.”21 It was Labour’s growing incapacity in the late 1970s that 
made failure and decline almost palpable to the country at large. The fact that the gov-
ernment’s demise came after the “winter of discontent” had brought the utter collapse of 
the “social contract,” Labour’s characteristic innovation, was tragically appropriate; and 
it turned the election of May 1979 into a referendum on an entire era of policymaking. 
 
  The Carter administration faced a comparable array of problems and, despite 
noble and laudable efforts, ended in apparent failure. In foreign policy Carter adopted 
an approach that was, at least on the surface, the opposite of Vietnam and of what Viet-
nam was thought to represent: his was a policy of limiting overseas commitments and of 
reconciling existing strategic and geopolitical interests with efforts to promote human 
rights.22 It required a reexamination of alliances to ensure that America’s partners were 
not themselves guilty of human rights violations. The new policy built upon principles 
that had been articulated in the early postwar era in the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and in the European Convention on Human Rights, but these had been 
more or less ignored in subsequent practice.23 The United States, for example, had a long 
history of expressing support for such principles but exempting itself from their detailed 
application, and the promotion of human rights was often sacrificed to the perceived 
                                                 
20P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000  (London: Longman, 2002), p. 640. The 
systemic character of Labour’s failures is discussed in J. Cronin, New Labour’s Pasts (London: 
Longman, 2004), chapter five. 
21“Surviving the Seventies,” Memo by James Cable, October 1974, FCO49/552. 
22On the difficulties and contradictions, see the useful discussion in Sean Wilentz, The Age of Rea-
gan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 2008), pp. 99-120. 
23There has been considerable recent interest in these founding moments of human rights politics. 
See, inter alia, Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins 
of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A 
New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,” Historical 
Journal XLVII,2 (2004): 379-398; A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001); Johannes Morsink, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: origins, drafting, intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, 1999); John Humphrey, Human Rights Law and the United Nations (Dobbs Ferry: 
Transnational Publishers, 1984); Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: De-
mocratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization LIV,2 (Spring, 2000): 217-252; 
and Kenneth Cmiel, “The Recent History of Human Rights,” American Historical Review CIX,1 
(February 2004): 117-135 . 
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exigencies of the Cold War.24 Progress in the international arena would resume in the 
1960s, however, with debate centering on South Africa and Rhodesia, and interest con-
tinued to grow in the following decade, partly as a result of the Helsinki Process. A for-
mal commitment to human rights became part of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and at 
least indirectly reconnected Cold War politics to human rights.25 Ironically, the pledges 
on human rights obtained through the “Helsinki process” – and due more to the insis-
tence of British and European negotiators than that of their American counterparts –
were at the time regarded by all sides as primarily cosmetic and as of only modest prac-
tical significance, whereas the process itself was widely perceived as a ratification of So-
viet influence in eastern Europe and of the “Brezhnev doctrine.”26 Over time the focus 
on human rights would of course have unintended and unforeseen consequences that 
served not to legitimate Soviet power but to undermine it.27 
 
  The new emphasis on human rights under Carter was more specifically intended 
to repair the damage done to America’s reputation by Vietnam and in that sense it rep-
resented the appropriate discursive accompaniment to a strategic policy of limits and 
constraints in military spending and in the use of force. The policy’s practical applica-
tion would soon be undermined, however, by the U.S. reaction to what were seen as a 
series of further setbacks: the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Islamist revo-
lution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The effect was to force Carter into 
a retreat from détente and into a decision modestly to increase defense spending. The 
promotion of human rights would therefore be given less priority in Carter’s last year or 
so, and it would initially be treated with disdain by his successor. Eventually, the Rea-
gan administration would rediscover how useful the focus on human rights could be in 
criticizing the Soviet Union. The issue would for that reason be revived, though re-
framed and deployed rather differently, during Reagan’s tenure, and practice always 
lagged. 
 
  The fitful and inconsistent advocacy of human rights by successive British and 
American governments did not by itself create a new international politics of rights. It 
did, however, combine with and give indirect support to the efforts of NGOs, interna-
tional courts and lawyers, and other countries – especially non-western countries eager 
to ground their anticolonial politics on human rights principles and smaller European 
nations more or less disengaged from either of the two main blocs or alliances – to craft 
an international human rights regime. These efforts found domestic echoes within both 
the U.S. and the UK. Britain was actually forced to confront the issue more directly than 
                                                 
24Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2005); Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” Journal 
of American History LXXXVI,3 (Dec., 1999): 1231-1250.  
25Interestingly, British representatives had played a key role in making sure that the Helsinki 
agreements covered Soviet human rights. See Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p. 80, for a sum-
mary; and Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume 2: The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75. (London: HMSO, 1984-) for the details.  
26On British and U.S. divergence on these issues, see Watt, Succeeding John Bull, pp. 156-57. 
27Daniel Thomas, “The Helsinki accords and political change in Eastern Europe,” in Thomas 
Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), pp. 205-233. 
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the U.S. because of its exposure over Southern Africa and Northern Ireland and its mem-
bership in the European Community.28 The effect, intended by some but not by all, was 
to reshape the legal and rhetorical landscape of international relations and to make sup-
port for human rights a more or less permanent feature of American and British foreign 
policy. 
 
  Such consequences were still to come as of the late 1970s. The more immediate 
issue confronting policymakers in the Carter era was the economy; and the Carter ad-
ministration fared as poorly on economic matters as it did on issues of security and for-
eign policy. Its multiple failures ensured that the reorientation of policy, both foreign 
and domestic and including the Anglo-American relationship, would necessarily be car-
ried out by others. Essentially, Carter and his aides had sought to handle the economic 
challenges of the 1970s using Keynesian tools developed in the early postwar era, and 
they had managed by the late 1970s to mitigate and contain the effects of the first oil 
shock.29 Unfortunately, the Iranian revolution in 1979 set off a second round of oil price 
increases that overwhelmed existing techniques and eroded confidence in their under-
lying Keynesian rationale. In consequence, inflation would peak while militants held 
Americans hostage in Tehran, allowing Carter’s opponents to connect failure at home 
with weakness abroad in a devastating critique. The outcome was the election of Ronald 
Reagan. Reagan and Thatcher between them proceeded to develop a very different set of 
responses to the crises affecting the two countries.  
 
Markets and Foreign Policy 
 
  Reagan and Thatcher inherited remarkably similar situations, and the fact that 
the common starting point was the perceived failure not only of their immediate prede-
cessors but also of the more long-term political consensus and style of governance that 
they represented meant that the two conservative politicians had a much greater oppor-
tunity to innovate than is normally the case.30 That they confronted roughly similar 
problems and were compelled to react to comparable orthodoxies also predisposed the 
governments to similar responses. So, too, did their broader ideological inheritance, 
which had been sharpened and reinvigorated by the work of a new array of conserva-
                                                 
28In response to these varied pressures, the Foreign Office in the fall of 1976 prepared a “Human 
Rights Comparative Assessment” to be used in deciding policy. The policy was overseen by Evan 
Luard, MP for Oxford and Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Foreign Office. See various TNA 
files, esp. FCO7/3021, FCO30/3644, FCO8/2863, FCO24/2356 for the policy in general; PREM16/975 
for Northern Ireland;  PREM16/1294 and HO274/36 on Europe and the question of whether to in-
corporate the European Convention on Human rights into UK law; and FCO82/651, FCO82/687, 
FCO82/760 and FCO82/806, on Britain’s subsequent dealings with the U.S. and the Carter admini-
stration on the issue.  
29See, among many others, Robert Skidelsky, ed., The End of the Keynesian Era (New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1977). 
30See Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986); and Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrench-
ment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), for thoughtful comparisons. 
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tive think tanks.31 The two conservative movements did not act in concert, but they did 
influence and inspire one another. The moves were parallel, not coordinated, and the ef-
forts logically brought the governments closer together. They also magnified the effect: 
either country acting alone would have constituted an interesting experiment; together, 
theirs became a movement with wide ramifications. 
 
  The essence of the strategies adopted by both conservative leaders would be neo-
liberalism, which dictated a new commitment to markets and to market-based solutions 
to domestic and international issues alike.32 Its most direct application was in economic 
policy. At home this entailed a variety of now familiar measures – tax cuts, especially on 
higher incomes, cuts in benefits or at least in the growth of entitlements, deregulation, 
privatization, and sustained efforts to weaken the trade unions. The mix differed in the 
two countries, but the effect was to move both economies in a similar direction and in 
the process to create a distinctive Anglo-American model of capitalism.33 
 
  There was also and inevitably a critical international dimension to economic pol-
icy in this period, for the Reagan and Thatcher governments sought to extend the reach 
of markets by opening up the domestic economy, by increasing the “competitiveness” of 
its firms and industries, and by prying open foreign markets. Thatcher was convinced, 
for example, that the tendency of successive British governments to prop up ailing firms 
had only exacerbated their lack of competitiveness. Thatcher was by contrast more than 
willing to see inefficient firms exposed to foreign competition and, if they failed to per-
form, to let them die. The effect was a massive rundown of inefficient industries and a 
decisive shift towards sectors in which Britain held an edge. The Conservative govern-
ment would further accelerate these trends by encouraging investment by foreign firms 
and by the deregulation of financial markets, beginning with the end of exchange con-
trols in October 1979 and culminating in the “big bang” of 1986.34 It also formally com-
mitted itself to the achievement of the European Single Market which, according to Mar-
garet Thatcher, “was very much a British initiative…,” and effectively signed up for 
                                                 
31See Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-83 (London: HarperCollins, 1995). More generally, see G. Edwards and D. Sanders, British 
Elite Attitudes and the United States (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989). 
32The term “neoliberalism” is widely used to describe this turn – everywhere but in the United 
States, where the term is used to describe the effort by Democrats from Gary Hart to Bill Clinton 
to move toward the political center. 
33See J. Cronin, “Convergence by Conviction: Politics and Economics in the Emergence of the 
‘Anglo-American Model,’” Journal of Social History XXXIII,4 (Summer, 2000): 781-804, for the argu-
ment that, prior to 1979, Britain represented something rather different than a “liberal market 
economy,” as it is now widely held to be. For more detail on the significance and effectiveness of 
Thatcher’s reforms, see David Card, Richard Blundel and Richard B. Freeman, eds., Seeking a Pre-
mier Economy: the economic effects of British economic reforms, 1980-2000 (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2004). 
34See Ronald Michie, “The City of London and the British government: the changing relation-
ship,” in Michie and Philip Williamson, eds., The British Government and the City of London in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 50-52; and David Kynas-
ton, The City of London: Club No More, 1945-2000 (London: Pimlico, 2002). 
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freer trade through and with the European Union.35 The liberalizing agenda within 
Europe was signaled by the appointment to Brussels first of Lord Cockfield in 1984, 
whose work laid the basis for the European single market, and then of Leon Brittan as 
European Commissioner with responsibility first for “competition policy” (1989-92) and 
subsequently for “trade policy” (1993-99).36 These appointments would play a central 
role in the opening up of markets within the EU and in the subsequent negotiations that 
preceded the establishment of the World Trade Organization.37 The two, especially Brit-
tan, would also leave a lasting mark on the Commission by training a cadre of free-
market advocates to carry on neoliberal policies beyond his tenure. Its stance within 
Europe meant that, as a close observer of British foreign relations noted in the early 
1990s, “Britain has nailed its free trade colors to the mast in the past decade, though not 
everyone else in the system has done so.”38 It also meant that the preference for markets 
had established itself at the center of the world’s largest economy. It might not be the 
dominant influence at any given moment and in any specific decision, as Margaret That-
cher would insist, but it was from the mid-1980s a consistent force that could not be ig-
nored.  
 
  The Reagan administration largely had as well, for it was similarly committed to 
allowing the discipline of the world market to determine winners and losers. It was not 
an easy position to maintain or enforce, however. U.S. trade policy had been conducted 
on a nonpartisan basis for most of the postwar era and had been fundamentally liberal: 
America was committed to expanding markets and its leaders believed that open trade 
made for a more prosperous and peaceful world. Through the GATT (the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, established in 1947), tariff barriers were thus much reduced 
and the United States, and its allies and trading partners, enjoyed the benefits of expand-
ing world trade. The onset of slower growth in the 1970s coincided, however, with more 
intense international competition and with a steady growth of imports in U.S. domestic 
markets. The result was a more intense and contentious era in trade politics during 
                                                 
35Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 372. The push for open markets 
in and through and with Europe had strong U.S. support. On U.S. support for European integra-
tion in general, see Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ through Integration: The United States and European In-
tegration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). There is considerable scholarly de-
bate about whether moves toward regional economic integration, like the EU, aid or retard the 
creation of a more open world economy. The theoretical argument could presumably go either 
way, but the assumption here is that for Britain integration into the EU was a “building block” 
rather than a “stumbling block” in the broad movement toward a liberal trading order. See Rug-
gie, Winning the Peace, pp. 129-134; and also Kees van der Pijl, “Lockean Europe?” New Left Review 
37 (Jan/Feb, 2006): 9-37. 
36Of course, Thatcher was very hard to please, so that, while she conceded that Lord Cockfield 
was key to the Single Market, she also regarded him as responsible for a subsequent falling-out. 
As she explained in The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 547: “It was all 
too easy for him … to go native and to move from deregulating the market to reregulating it 
under the rubric of harmonization.” 
37See John Gillingham, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate of New Market Economy? (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 303, 306-08 
38Michael Clarke, British External Policy-making in the 1990s (London: Macmillan and the Royal 
Institute for International Affiars, 1992), p. 47. 
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which protectionist pressures increased markedly.39 Those hurt or threatened by 
imports – first textiles, apparel, and shoes, then steel and automobiles, and always 
agriculture – mobilized and pressed for special relief or outright protection. The deep 
recession of the early 1980s and the rise in the value of the dollar put the Reagan 
administration, despite its commitment to open markets, very much on the defensive 
and Congress became more partisan and active on questions of trade.40 
                                                
 
  The consequence, after much maneuver, posturing, debate and compromise, was 
a hybrid strategy that has been effectively described as “assertive unilateralism.”41 The 
administration successfully resisted a broader turn to protection by acquiescing in deals 
for specific industries, by hard bargaining with trading partners, especially Japan, for 
voluntary restraints, and by seeking to identify and eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. 
The compromise was embodied in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. This was a substan-
tial achievement, for it had come in the teeth of sustained lobbying from industries un-
able to compete with imports and from trade unions and their Democratic Party allies 
who sought not only to protect domestic industry through tariffs or quotas but also to 
adopt a more statist “industrial policy” to cope with intensified global competition.42     
 
  The overvalued dollar and America’s enduring trade deficit would keep trade on 
the agenda throughout the 1980s, but economic revival permitted an outcome more in 
keeping with the administration’s basic outlook. It was facilitated as well by the more 
aggressive trade strategy adopted in 1985. The key initiative was the Plaza Agreement of 
September 22, which began the depreciation of the dollar. In two years it had reversed 
the appreciation that had begun in 1979 and effectively made U.S. exporters competitive 
once again. Shortly after, the Uruguay Round of GATT talks was initiated with the ex-
 
39See Gillingham, European Integration, pp. 105-120, for a useful discussion of “The New Protec-
tionism” and “Neomercantilism” in Europe during the 1970s. Something similar, if less deeply 
rooted in institutions, was occurring in the U.S. 
40See I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 3rd ed. (Washington DC.: Institute for International Eco-
nomics, 1995), for details and for a thoughtful discussion of the dynamics of American trade poli-
tics.  
41See Jagdish Bhagwati and H.T. Patrick, eds., Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy 
and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990). As the title 
makes clear, they use the term to refer to one specific provision. It would seem, however, to have 
a broader applicability to the range of policies adopted during the 1980s. For a more dramatic ac-
count, see Steve Dryden, Trade warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995).  
42See Otis L. Graham, Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1992). More generally, see Philip Cerny, “Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dy-
namics of Political Globalization,” Government and Opposition XXXII,2 (1997): 251-274; President’s 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality (Washington DC: 
U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1985); Paul Krugman, “Making Sense of the Competitiveness Debate,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy XII,3 (1996): 17-25; Alan Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Sur-
vival, 1933-1991 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 85; and, most recently, Tore Fougner, “The State, 
international competitiveness and neoliberal globalisation: is there a future beyond the ‘competi-
tion state’?” Review of International Studies, XXXII (2006), 165-185. The concern with competitive-
ness began just prior to the accession of Reagan and Thatcher, but became much more intense 
thereafter. 
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plicit aim of reducing trade barriers in agriculture and services.43 The Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 provided further assistance in the effort to expand 
trade and markets: it extended “fast-track” negotiating authority needed to continue 
progress in multilateral trade talks, it strengthened the administration’s hand in seeking 
to penetrate closed foreign markets, and it contained relatively few protectionist provi-
sions that might have provoked resistance or retaliation from other countries. By the late 
1980s, the commitment to a market-oriented economic strategy was largely secured. 
 
  Economic strategy was thus simultaneously and explicitly a matter of internal 
and external policy, and it was market-oriented in both countries. It was also normative 
and prescriptive, for the U.S. – with strong support from the Thatcher government – 
urged a turn to world markets and the freeing up of internal markets as the preferred al-
ternative to the more state-centered strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
previously followed by many developing countries. This new “Washington consensus,” 
or “Washington/London consensus,” was largely adopted and enforced by interna-
tional economic institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD, within which 
the U.S. and Britain exercised major influence.44 Again, while it is likely that the U.S. 
would have fought for such a policy reversal on its own, the fact that it did so with Brit-
ish support made U.S. advocacy more effective, in part by reducing America’s exposure 
and vulnerability. Just as British efforts on behalf of the Single Market extended the 
reach of market-oriented policies within Europe, so the joint U.S./UK stance on the in-
ternational economy rendered it more compelling. 
 
  The external dimension of neoliberalism was also taken further and in a new di-
rection as the Reagan and Thatcher regimes argued that opening markets and encourag-
ing trade would also bring peace and democracy. The heightened anti-Soviet rhetoric of 
Reagan and Thatcher was routinely accompanied by a curiously simple formula in 
which free markets and human rights would effect an almost painless victory over com-
munism. Thus when Ronald Reagan addressed Parliament in June 1982, he called for a 
strategy to resist totalitarianism by opening markets and by fostering “the infrastructure 
of democracy – the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities,” the ex-
change of ideas, and ultimately free elections. Coincidentally, or so it would appear, the 
1970s had seen democratic transitions in key states in southern Europe; and the 1980s 
would witness a further turn towards democracy first in an array of developing coun-
tries, especially in Latin America, and later in Eastern Europe.45 For the first time since 
the end of the Great War, it had become credible to argue that markets and democracy 
                                                 
43See James Shoch, Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
44There is a huge literature on the Washington consensus. For a useful starting point, see Ngaire 
Woods, The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers (Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
45See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), for whom the key variable was not markets or changes in 
class structure, as many would argue, but the shifting stance of the Catholic Church. 
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were genuinely compatible and self-reinforcing.46 Surveying these developments as they 
were unfolding, Reagan felt justified in claiming that, “These democratic and free-
market revolutions are really the same revolution.”47 Margaret Thatcher was prone to 
similar pronouncements. She had told an audience in Brussels in 1978 that, “Democracy 
depends on private enterprise as well as the ballot box and countries which have the 
first are more likely to be able to move towards the second. Free enterprise has histori-
cally usually preceded freedom, and political freedom has never long survived the end 
of free enterprise.”48 Not surprisingly, Thatcher positioned herself and the British gov-
ernment alongside Reagan throughout the 1980s, echoing his passionate advocacy of 
free markets, and seeking wherever possible to demonstrate Britain’s role as America’s 
best friend and ally in the promotion of markets and rights. 
 
  This combining of markets and rights was a distinctive part of the neoliberal out-
look. It represented an adaptation and substantial reworking of the commitment to hu-
man rights made during the Carter administration. It is obvious that neither Reagan nor 
Thatcher shared the sentimental, and principled, attachment to rights and democracy 
that lay behind Carter’s discourse and that in some measure informed Labour’s interna-
tionalist outlook. The Reagan campaign had in fact been happy to denounce the nega-
tive consequences that they claimed had flowed from Carter’s policies. But once in 
power Reagan and Thatcher found it useful to continue talking about rights and democ-
racy, even as they chose to add or substitute freedom and free markets in their particular 
formulations and even as their practice was highly selective. What made it attractive to 
maintain previous policies was, of course, their effectiveness in criticizing the Soviet 
Union, particularly at a time when verbal criticism was much safer and easier than 
armed confrontation. 
 
  While the commitment to markets, rights and democracy was the most novel fea-
ture of the new policy framework, military and strategic orientations were also brought 
into line. This might not be immediately obvious, for the most visible phenomena at the 
time were the heating up of Cold War rhetoric and loose talk about the real possibility of 
using nuclear weapons.49 Reality matched discourse in the realm of military spending, 
                                                 
46See Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and S.M. Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, 4 vols. 
(Boulder CO: L. Rienner, 1988); and Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of De-
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which increased substantially under Reagan and Thatcher, in the decision to deploy a 
new generation of intermediate range weapons, specifically Pershing and Cruise mis-
siles, and in the 1993 proposal for a missile defense system popularly known as “Star 
Wars.” 
 
  Ironically, however, these aggressive moves were to a considerable extent mis-
leading, for they were not backed up by plans for major military interventions and ac-
tual engagements were marginal, short-term and relatively risk-free. Nor were existing 
arms agreements jettisoned.50 The reluctance actually to use the massive arsenal at 
America’s disposal would be termed the Weinberger doctrine after Reagan’s Secretary of 
Defense and it would later become known as the Powell doctrine. For both of these ar-
chitects of American strategy the experience of Vietnam was formative, a disaster never 
to be repeated. Instead, they reverted to what was already an outmoded strategic orien-
tation, the Air-Land Battle Doctrine devised in the early 1980s by the U.S. Army. Turn-
ing the focus away from efforts to combat guerilla forces, planners reimagined a large-
scale confrontation with the Soviets in which U.S. and western forces would be outnum-
bered and outgunned by the Red Army and its allies. However unlikely this scenario, it 
was one in which success would depend on the ability to combine air and land forces 
and to use advanced technology and superior mobility to counter the Soviet advantage. 
The implication was that the U.S. should not merely maintain its existing military forces 
but enhance their effectiveness with new weapons and communications technology. 
This battle-fighting strategy would be combined in future with a political effort to en-
sure that the military received the resources and the public support it deemed necessary 
to prevail in a conflict. The Weinberger/Powell doctrine was to this extent far from paci-
fic, but it did place serious constraints on when and where and how military forces 
would be deployed.51 Thus the lessons of Vietnam and, for Britain and the U.S., the les-
sons learned from the end of empire, would serve as the foundation for future military 
strategy, and it was this new post-imperial realism that insured that the rhetorical ex-
cesses of the 1980s were routinely held in check by cautious and pragmatic policies. 
 
  The adoption of a new policy framework also provided the occasion for a reas-
sertion of the “special relationship” between Britain and America. This was in part due 
to the shared vision of Thatcher and Reagan and to their obvious personal chemistry. 
But there was also at least some recognition of mutual need. Any lingering British aspi-
ration for a world role required that it be achieved in alliance with the United States, and 
the Thatcher government chose not only to renew the alliance but also to ignore slights 
and disagreements that might have disrupted it. Equally important, it appears that the 
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British willingness to fight over the Falklands convinced American officials that, unique-
ly among allies, Britain might make at least some useful military contribution to the al-
lied cause.52 On the American side, and rather more surprisingly, the Reagan adminis-
tration sensed that its policies were genuinely controversial and worked hard to defend 
them and to win allies. In fact, at the height of the mass protests over nuclear weapons in 
1982 Reagan undertook a tour of European capitals to argue for American policies and 
to shore up alliances. The first stop was Britain and it is clear that the Thatcher govern-
ment’s solid support was in the context extremely welcome. Alongside these pragmatic 
calculations was the simple fact that while Britain and the U.S. had other allies, it was 
only the two countries, or their governments, that shared the broader neoliberal para-
digm for managing both economic and foreign policy. The effect was to align their inter-
ests and thus to put them routinely on the same side on major international issues and in 
international institutions. 
 
Ending the Cold War 
 
  Remarkably—and perhaps only accidentally—the policy mix adopted during the 
1980s by the U.S. and the UK was rewarded and seemingly ratified as grand strategy by 
the collapse of socialism and the end of the Cold War. Success in the Cold War would 
smooth over awkward details about failed missions and egregious mistakes – Iran-
Contra most notably – by shifting the focus to the outcome of that great contest. It would 
therefore confer a retrospective consistency and coherence on the policy initiatives of the 
1980s and transform them into a formula that could be applied to the world after the 
Cold War’s ending. This is a rare occurrence in policymaking, especially in the making 
of foreign policy, which tends to be reactive and dominated by the need to deal with un-
foreseen events rather than with reference to first principles. Even the actions of a  self-
proclaimed “conviction” politician such as Margaret Thatcher were characterized by 
aides as a matter of “what next” rather than what follows from our beliefs and program-
mes.53 Ronald Reagan’s famed indifference to detail perhaps made him by default a 
leader guided by a broad philosophical outlook, but this is hardly a recipe for effectively 
embedding principles into strategy. And, of course, events do not always fit easily with-
in the dictates of grand strategy, as the historical record shows repeatedly. The recent 
foreign policy experience of the U.S. and Britain in the 1980s had been different, how-
ever, and what distinguished it were four unusual features: the first was that there were 
significant and more or less simultaneous innovations in both internal and external poli-
cies in the two countries; the second was the unique congruence between policy at home 
and abroad; the third was the fact that policymaking was more coherent than usual in 
both Britain and the U.S.; and fourth, the outcome made it all look even more coherent 
and principled.  
 
  These unique circumstances ensured that the new paradigm would become the 
basis for Anglo-American efforts to shape the post-Cold-War world order. A well-armed 
but restrained military posture harnessed to a liberal or neoliberal agenda had appar-
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ently won the Cold War and so required only minor adjustment in its aftermath. In this 
situation timing was everything: a more long-term view of how the Cold War was 
“won” might well have suggested that success depended first and foremost on the via-
bility of the post-World War II settlements, with their commitments to expanded social 
provision and full employment, rather than upon the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. If that 
were so, then a successful transition to a post-Cold War world order might likewise re-
quire something akin to a new Marshall Plan coupled with institutional innovations 
comparable to those put in place in the 1940s.54 But because the Cold War ended with 
this new and more muscular liberalism in place as economic and foreign policy, options 
of this sort were never taken very seriously. In consequence, the Charter of Paris agreed 
to in November 1990 contained no basic departure from what had gone before: it was a 
limited constitutional document, merely reaffirming the commitment of states to human 
rights, democracy and secure borders, and it was unaccompanied by grand gestures 
aimed at reconstruction or welfare or at recasting international institutions. 55 Instead the 
American, or Anglo-American, vision of a new world order involved a continuation of 
existing security strategies with minimal adaptation, the continued advocacy of human 
rights, and an intensification of the push for open markets.56 And because this vision 
was already in place, and so apparently successful, when the Cold War ended, it would 
become the starting point for the elaboration of a post-Cold-War world order.  
 
  Probably the most significant practical consequence was the continuity in mili-
tary affairs. As the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union evaporated, defenders 
of the military and defense industries geared up to resist demands for decreasing de-
fense spending and for diverting savings to domestic needs, the so-called “peace divi-
dend.” Very quickly, for example, U.S. military planners proposed standards for ensur-
ing U.S. military predominance far into the future: not only should the U.S. be prepared 
to fight wars simultaneously on two fronts, it should also seek to prevent the emergence 
of any serious challenger. The fullest articulation of this grand vision was the “Defense 
Planning Guidance” document issued by the Defense Department under Dick Cheney in 
1992. The boldness of the program led to its quick abandonment, at least in public, but it 
captured well the goals of strategic planners.57 Better arguments for those goals could in 
fact be found elsewhere by focusing upon the dangers posed by “rogue” or “outlaw” 
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states with regional ambitions and the problems of nuclear proliferation and the more 
general availability of “weapons of mass destruction.”58 Absent a clear case, such argu-
ments might not have prevailed against advocates of cuts in defense spending, but Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided an almost irrefutable argument. The successful 
prosecution of the first Gulf war, and the effective marshalling of a UN-backed coalition 
in its support, served to underline the importance of maintaining strong U.S. military 
capabilities.  
 
  British foreign defense policy moved in a parallel direction. Thatcher had of 
course chosen to work closely with the U.S. in the closing years of the Cold War and 
supported Gorbachev just enough to see him fall and the Soviet Union dissolve. The 
Thatcher government had more hesitations over German reunification, but accepted the 
outcome, and it worked together with the U.S. to create a new rationale and architecture 
for NATO.59 The objective was to maintain NATO’s transatlantic basis while moving to-
wards an enhanced European defense commitment and to further the alliance’s east-
ward extension so as to consolidate the geopolitical gains from the collapse of Soviet 
power. It is likely that, absent the Anglo-American connection, NATO  would have 
evolved in a very different direction in the 1990s. As it was, it not only continued in its 
Atlanticist orientation but at U.S. and UK urging began as well to contemplate “out of 
area” operations and capabilities. At the same time, Britain’s own investment in defense 
would also remain substantial: the 1990 “Options for Change” review of defense policy 
involved reductions in spending made necessary by the state’s finances and possible by 
the ending of the Cold War, but it did not envision an end to Britain’s purported world 
role, its status as a nuclear power and its alliance with the United States. The U.S. and 
UK would move still closer during the ensuing Gulf War, when diplomacy and war 
merged. The coalition against Iraq was of course much broader, but the core of it was an 
Anglo-American alliance. Relations became a bit more strained after the war, as the Bush 
administration moved on its own in the Middle East and John Major’s attention was di-
verted elsewhere.60 More serious differences would also emerge over whether to inter-
vene in Yugoslavia. On balance, however, in the early post-Cold-War era, Britain and 
the United States locked themselves in to a more or less common stance in terms of de-
fense and security policy.61 
 
  The security regime thus remained largely intact. At the same time, the liberal re-
gime of trade and exchange was further expanded. The Democrat Bill Clinton proved as 
eager as his Republican predecessors to extend the scope of trade liberalization. The fact 
that Clinton won election on economic issues predisposed his administration to put the 
economy first and, as the candidate put it at Georgetown University in December 1991, 
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“to tear down the wall between domestic and foreign policy.”  Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee much the same thing: the new 
administration would “not be bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our eco-
nomic goals” and would seek to “advance America’s economic security with the same 
energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War.”62 Clinton’s foreign 
policy would be framed rather inelegantly as a matter of “engagement and enlarge-
ment.”63 This could be achieved best by indirect and multilateral means that embedded 
states within international networks and eased the transition to democracy or, in hard 
cases, by intervening in “rogue” or “failed” states. In practice, the Clinton administra-
tion’s major and most successful efforts were directed into a policy of enlarging NATO 
and the European Union as a means of “locking in” the shift towards democracy in cen-
tral and eastern Europe and a broader campaign “to expand and strengthen the world’s 
community of free-market democracies.”64 The aim was virtually identical to that of the 
previous administration: “to secure and extend the remarkable democratic ‘zone of 
peace’ that we and our allies now enjoy.”65 Underpinning the policies of both Clinton 
and his predecessors was the faith that capitalism and democracy were mutually rein-
forcing and that democracies did not go to war with each other.66 
 
  Within this strategic framework it was therefore a matter of both economic policy 
and security strategy to undertake efforts to encourage exports, which meant continued 
hard bargaining with Japan, as well as to ratify the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and to “engage” with China economically as the most realistic strategy for 
reform and as part of a more long-term “engagement” with nations of the Pacific Rim. 
The Clinton administration also worked extremely hard to assure a successful outcome 
for the Uruguay Round of GATT talks that led to the creation of the World Trade Organi-
zation in 1995. Later on, Clinton would work furiously to convince Congress and the 
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Senate in 2000 to approve the grant to China of “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” 
(PNTR) status, the prerequisite to joining the WTO. 
 
  British policy followed a parallel course, both on security and defense issues as 
well as on matters of trade liberalization. Despite the rise in Eurosceptic sentiment 
among his fellow Tories, John Major continued to support Britain’s further economic in-
tegration into Europe and the further opening of its economy via that route. He success-
fully secured an “opt-out” from the sections of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on social and 
labor issues and the inclusion of language reaffirming the “centrality of the American se-
curity relationship.”67 These achievements did not silence Major’s critics, of course, and 
treaty approval would require a year and a half of bitter debate. Still, it was eventually 
won and the country signed up to further steps toward economic integration, if not to-
wards the single currency. Britain also worked for and welcomed the creation of the 
WTO and expected great benefits from the liberalization of insurance and financial ser-
vices, fields in which the UK enjoyed an acknowledged comparative edge.68 The British 
Ambassador to the United States during the early 1990s, Robin Renwick, recalled later 
that he and his staff “worked together very closely with the Americans in achieving a 
successful outcome to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to the setting up 
of the WTO…”69  Michael Hesseltine, President of the Board of Trade, continued the push 
for open markets and insisted in 1995 that “The UK’s reliance on export-led growth de-
mands further steps towards liberal markets, not a move backwards to protectionism.”  
A Chatham House study recommended the same stance shortly after: “In an age when 
the way to economic success is agreed, with an unprecedented global unanimity, to be 
open markets and free competition, the proximate goal of British policy must therefore 
be to extend and consolidate the global free trading system that has been constructed in 
recent years and is now overseen by the WTO.”70   
 
  Inevitably, there were specific trade disputes with the U.S., and probably more 
because of British membership in the EU, but detailed disagreements on particular prod-
ucts and industries flow logically from, and constitute a kind of indirect confirmation of, 
a shared commitment to an economic strategy of growth through trade. So, too, does the 
fact that at roughly the same time, the UK adopted an American-style policy of recipro-
cal negotiations aimed at penetrating closed markets, the so-called “Trade Barriers Stra-
tegy.” Through and alongside the EU Britain sought to expand its continental market 
and to open world markets; while within the EU Britain pushed for more competition 
and flexible labor markets that, it was hoped, would disproportionately benefit British 
companies.  
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After the Cold War: From Iraq to Iraq, by way of Sarajevo and Seattle 
 
  The policy paradigm inherited from the last years of the Cold War was thus the 
foundation for what the U.S. and the UK sought to do and for the world order they tried 
to craft during the 1990s. And coming on top of the fall of Communism and the less dra-
matic, but nevertheless impressive, defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991, the effort was ac-
companied by an optimism that bordered on the utopian. The sentiment was not con-
fined to recently vindicated cold warriors celebrating the apparent “End of History,” but 
also infected normally more cautious scholars of international relations and even politi-
cal philosophers who are typically pretty disenchanted about actually existing politics.71 
It became commonplace to theorize about the “democratic peace,” with its assumed 
links between democracy, capitalism and peace, and about the possibility of enlarging 
the sphere of “market-oriented democracies.”72 In this vision globalization was not sim-
ply a matter of expanding trade but of spreading democracy and peace. Whether these 
sentiments were entirely delusional or a plausible reckoning with what was in fact a mo-
ment of world-historic significance, can well be debated. What is surely not debatable is 
the fact that this view of the world described a prospect that is a long way from the re-
alities of international politics and from the policies of the United States and Britain 
since 9/11.  
 
  Obviously, the attacks on New York and Washington had a great deal to do with 
this transformation and so, too, did the fact that George W. Bush happened to be in the 
White and was flanked there by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, however, 
the policies pursued by the partners in the “special relationship” had already begun to 
shift during the 1990s. The shift had come in response to developments which, though 
partly foreseen, had not been fully reckoned with, and these developments led in a di-
rection that modified, if not the principles and objectives, at least the implementation of 
the neoliberal paradigm. What drove this shift, prior to 9/11, were two factors: the first 
was the continued difficulty of dealing with “rogue states” and the “humanitarian cri-
ses” to which they seemed prone and which were so prominent a feature of interna-
tional relations during the 1990s; and the ongoing process known as the “revolution in 
military affairs” which gradually undermined the Powell doctrine and the overall policy 
of military restraint. A brief review should serve at least to illustrate these processes. 
 
  The first serious post-Cold-War crisis arose with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
posed no major challenge to the inherited Anglo-American policy framework. On the 
contrary, it largely reinforced existing strategy. The massive military forces marshaled 
against Iraq, and the choice not to topple the regime when it was routed on the field of 
battle, suggested that the Weinberger/Powell doctrine still governed strategy. The coali-
tion put together to respond to the invasion also provided plausible grounds for believ-
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ing that the Anglo-American alliance was compatible with a multilateral approach to 
international affairs. Indeed, the incoming Clinton administration was sufficiently im-
pressed that it actually spent its early days developing guidelines for future UN peace-
keeping missions.73 At the same time, however, the first Gulf War did signal the future 
in two critical ways: first, by showing the possible danger posed by a “rogue” state; and 
second, by highlighting the potential of new types of high-tech warfare. Subsequent 
events would make it still clearer how difficult it would be to use the existing array of 
international institutions and preferred policy options to deal with the problems created 
by “rogue” or “failed” states.  
 
  The most visible case was Yugoslavia, where the U.S. and its allies were frus-
trated both by the intractability of the conflict and also by their failure to agree. The 
Clinton and first Bush administrations were cautious about intervening in Yugoslavia, 
the Major government highly resistant. The difference was partly a matter of principle 
and partly a disagreement about the means rather than the ends of policy. The United 
States insisted that the fate of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia was a European 
problem that Europeans should address. It was reluctant to commit its own forces or to 
support UN efforts. Fairly early on, however, the U.S. determined that the Serbs were 
the aggressors and ought to be confronted. The British government under Major and 
Douglas Hurd adopted a more neutral stance, preferring to see the merits of both sides 
in the conflict, and emphasizing the practical difficulties of intervention. Eventually, 
events in Sarajevo and Srbenica aroused a level of popular indignation that prompted 
the U.S., Britain and other European countries to get involved: the arms embargo was 
lifted, air strikes were called in on the Bosnian Serbs, and the U.S. and the EU began the 
negotiations which produced the Dayton Accords in 1995.74 By that time, however, enor-
mous losses had been incurred by the local populations and policymakers in the U.S., 
Britain and elsewhere had concluded that the failure to act earlier had demonstrated 
once again the ineffectiveness of existing international institutions, especially the Euro-
pean Union and the United Nations, and the inadequacy of the principles on which they 
operated. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezezinski put it not long af-
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ter, “the crisis in Bosnia offered painful proof of Europe’s continued absence, if proof 
were still needed.”75 The UN was equally absent. 
 
  Failure and indecision were obviously not confined to Europe. The early 1990s 
witnessed not only the bloody events in Yugoslavia but also the decision by the United 
States to pull out of Somalia under duress in 1993 and the broader failure of the interna-
tional community to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The post-Cold-War promise 
of a “new world order,” so palpable in 1990-91, had by the mid-1990s turned to disap-
pointment.76 In the aftermath of its failed exercises in “assertive multilateralism” and the 
comparable disasters that had come from the absence of multilateral action, the U.S. in 
particular became more reluctant to commit troops and money in places where it could 
not be confident of the outcome. In this context, however, the Clinton administration 
came to a somewhat greater appreciation of the value of British support. The connection 
with Britain “stands above the rest; a model for the ties that should bind democracies,” 
Clinton argued in November 1995, and with the election of Tony Blair in 1997 the U.S. 
president now had a partner with whom he could deal.  
 
  British and American leaders and policies would become unusually close in the 
late 1990s and they would traverse much the same course in their thinking about inter-
national relations, the problem of “rogue” states and “humanitarian intervention”, and 
the recourse to armed force. Collaboration was most marked over Iraq and Kosovo. In 
Iraq Saddam Hussein began to resist further UN inspections, while international sup-
port for the sanctions regime started to fray as its impact on civilians became the subject 
of intense debate. The U.S. and UK governments took a common and tough line, with 
the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook arguing in March 1998 that “Saddam Hussein 
is the clearest example of a leader who is also a terrorist.” When Iraq expelled inspectors 
the following December, Britain and the U.S. carried out joint air strikes.  
 
  The attacks on Iraq had little effect and received little support at home or abroad. 
But shortly after, a new crisis arose in which it appeared a decisive intervention might 
actually make a difference and elicit international approval. Stymied in Bosnia, Serb 
forces were by 1999 applying pressure on Kosovo aimed at stifling the region’s drive for 
autonomy. NATO was eager to prove its worth after its earlier embarrassment but, as 
with the previous crises, there was an intense debate over military options, in particular 
over the use of air power versus the deployment of ground forces. Blair very much took 
the lead in this case, arguing that both were needed, while Clinton was distracted and 
also wary of committing American troops. As the confrontation unfolded, Blair used a 
scheduled speech in Chicago in April, 1999 to articulate his “doctrine of international 
community.”77 In this he laid out the rationale, and conditions, for humanitarian inter-
vention.  Clinton was forced in the end to agree; and the threat of invasion, coupled with 
                                                 
75Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Implications 
(New York: Basic, 1997), p. 59. 
76 Mead, Special Providence, pp. 264-309. 
77Tony Blair, speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, April 22, 1999. For an assessment of the 
speech’s implications and its implicit rehabilitation of older principles and arguments about “the 
standard of civilization,” see Jackson, The Global Covenant, pp. 355-360 and for background, Ger-
ritt Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 
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the ongoing air campaign, forced the Serbian leadership to capitulate. In the aftermath, 
the United Nations ratified the NATO campaign and undertook to supervise the peace. 
 
  Success in Kosovo was critical in three respects: first, it underlined the reality and 
potential usefulness of the “special relationship” in international affairs; second, it pro-
vided a practical template for military intervention outside the control of the UN; and 
third, because intervention in Kosovo was judged to have been “illegal, but legitimate,” 
it in effect stretched the acceptable boundaries of international law so as to permit clear 
violations of sovereignty by ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”78 Military action against 
Iraq and Serbia also provided a clear indication that while Tony Blair and New Labour 
might claim to pursue an “ethical foreign policy,” it would not necessarily be a pacifist 
one. So, too, did the roughly simultaneous conclusions of the Defence Policy Review of 
1998, which continued the gradual reduction in British military spending but reaffirmed 
the Labour Party’s conversion to maintaining both conventional and nuclear forces and 
added to the defense repertoire with the creation of a “rapid reaction force.”79 After Ko-
sovo, then, the search for a new world order had come to be defined as a largely Anglo-
American concern, for not only did the U.S. and Britain together – although of course the 
United States could do much of this all alone – wield massive clout, but their collabora-
tion was built upon a vision of common interests and a legacy of trust deriving from a 
history of joint ventures; and it was organized around a reasonably coherent and at least 
plausible set of principles encompassing human rights, the rule of law, democratic gov-
ernance and open markets. It was almost inevitable, then, that at the core of any future 
“coalition of the willing” would be the narrower, but more firmly based, Anglo-
American alliance.  
 
  The contrast with the weakness and discord and paralysis that seemed the rule 
elsewhere in the world and in the international institutions which superintended it rein-
forced this identification of British and American interests and strategic outlooks. So, 
too, did the evident prosperity that Britain and the United States enjoyed during the 
1990s, again in contrast with others – in this case former models like Germany and Japan 
and friendly rivals like France. Not only did a return to growth make it possible for both 
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Britain and the United States to envision a future in which the two nations would be 
more involved in maintaining world order than other countries, but it also necessitated 
it. Growth for the two economies was closely linked to the expansion of trade and in-
vestment, that is to globalization, and it could not be prolonged without sustained ex-
pansion of the world market. Economic success also served to confirm the policy choices 
of the past two decades. The turn to markets and trade and away from the state, begun 
in the 1980s, may or may not have produced the results of the late 1990s, but it was not 
unreasonable to presume a connection. The “Anglo-American model” thus came to be 
seen as at least as successful as Japanese or German models of capitalism.80   
 
  This “neoliberal” achievement had also, incidentally, created a much greater de-
gree of practical integration between the British and American economies.81 Britain and 
the U.S. were major sources and recipients of investment from companies that increas-
ingly defined themselves as “Anglo-American.” This was not quite the “Anglosphere” 
about which the Daily Telegraph fantasized, nor was there any realistic prospect of Brit-
ain leaving the European Union and joining NAFTA, as the more extreme Tories and at 
least some conservative American politicians proposed.82 But it did add a material 
underpinning, an infrastructure, to the convergence of interests, outlooks and policies. 
And, so long as prosperity lasted, so also would the shared confidence that the Anglo-
American model and the “special relationship” were useful for the two countries and for 
the world. The fact that U.S. primacy and the Anglo-American alliance in the 1990s were 
rooted not only in matters military and diplomatic and in the political culture, but also 
in the strength and the structure of their increasingly open and interrelated economies, 
imparted a robustness to both phenomena. Put differently, the choices and policies of 
the preceding and defining era ensured that the realities they left in place would now 
profit from institutional inertia and from the support of powerful vested interests and 
that they would constitute the starting point for subsequent development as well as the 
measure against which alternatives would be judged.83   
 
  By the turn of the millennium, therefore, Anglo-American power and a particular 
vision of how it should be deployed was a structural feature of the emerging world or-
der. That vision was an elaboration and updating of the paradigm that began to emerge 
in the 1980s. As of the late 1990s it had come to be embodied in four by now largely fa-
miliar principles: first, the maintenance of U.S. military strength and predominance, 
augmented at least marginally by UK military and intelligence support; second, a shared 
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commitment to open and opening markets; third, the belief that the promotion of de-
mocracy and human rights could best be promoted by “enlargement and engagement” 
through membership in organizations such as NATO, the EU and the WTO; together with 
the corollary that “humanitarian intervention” might be necessary to deter or replace 
“rogue states” when engagement had otherwise failed. The last two principles put the 
emerging Anglo-American vision potentially at odds with more classically Wilsonian 
visions that vested the hope for world order in international law, in institutions such as 
the United Nations, and its de facto multilateral approach to peace and stability. 
 
  This divergence was not new, though it appeared so when the Bush administra-
tion made loud and explicit what had been mentioned only sotto voce and in the fine 
print of the policy pronouncements of earlier administrations. The United States has had 
a long tradition of unilateralism and “exceptionalism” that was much in evidence, and 
much criticized abroad, even during the Clinton administration.84 On the other hand, 
skepticism about the UN system was widely shared even outside the United States. The 
so-called “Charter system” of the UN was based on the elevation of national sovereignty 
above any consideration of justice and was for that reason alone morally and philosophi-
cally suspect.85 The practical difficulties of coordinating action through an organization 
whose executive arm, the Security Council, was crippled or at least inhibited by the pos-
sibility of a veto by any of five key states with potentially conflicting interests merely 
confirmed the limited appeal of the UN as an institution for constructing and maintain-
ing global order.  
 
  The tension between the global vision of the United States, and its closest ally, 
and the hopes of others, including some traditional U.S. or UK allies, for a more multi-
polar and multilateral world order, were thus embedded in the emerging international 
system at the end of the century. The election of George Bush and the adoption by his 
administration of a more unilateralist tone, backed up by practical moves to reject the 
Kyoto Protocols, to “unsign” the commitment to the International Criminal Court, to re-
sume research on missile defense and, as part of that, to renounce the ABM Treaty, made 
the tension much more palpable.86 Even so, prior to 9/11 these unilateralist gestures 
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were mostly symbolic and were accompanied by a determination to avoid local entan-
glements, humanitarian ventures and nation-building. But then came the attack on the 
World Trade Center, the U.S. declaration of a “war on terror,” and the decision to launch 
military action against Afghanistan.  
 
  The effect of 9/11 was to bring together divergent tendencies in American policy 
and to make the resulting mix simultaneously more martial and more unilateralist. The 
enormous military power wielded by the U.S. would be used for interventions whose 
rationale was now not merely “humanitarian” but also a matter of security; democracy 
would be promoted not merely by engagement but by force; and the choice for force 
would be made largely by the United States, in league with its most trusted or at least 
compliant ally, and without much regard for the “international community.” What 
made this militarization so easy politically was that in fact the different emphases in 
American and British policy were just that, differences in emphasis but not necessarily 
over fundamentals. Not only had Blair and Clinton, for example, backed the use of force 
on more than one occasion, but Reagan, Thatcher and the first President Bush had hap-
pily used the rhetoric of human rights and democracy as a complement to arms. Central 
to the American and Anglo-American global vision since the 1980s, moreover,  was the 
neoliberal push towards open markets, freer trade and global interconnectedness and 
the belief, perhaps self-serving but not entirely insincere, that democracy and peace 
would follow.87 The turn to force in American, and thus Anglo-American, foreign policy 
was to this extent not in the main a product of a “neo-conservative” conspiracy, even if 
neo-conservatives flattered themselves that it was.88 It was a result of a long-term, 
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settled and largely consensual policy orientation that had gravitated increasingly toward 
force and that, with September 11, was pushed still further in that direction. Of course, 
the “Bush doctrine” was greeted and denounced as a major break, and it may well be 
that its massively incompetent implementation and its sorry aftereffects will result in a 
break from the past, from international norms and from allies that will not easily be 
reversed. Its formulation and adoption were nevertheless long in the making. 
                                                
 
The shift to a more aggressive unilateralism was also made possible -- indeed it 
was premised upon – another long-term development that was also labeled incorrectly 
as a revolution. This was the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” which had pro-
vided the United States with a vast technological lead in the tools and techniques of war-
making. The potential for more intelligent weaponry, implicit in the Air-Land Doctrine 
of the 1980s and helped along by scientific and technical advances associated with the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was demonstrated in the Gulf War. That experience 
convinced American policymakers to continue to build up and to rely upon more so-
phisticated weapons using advanced electronic controls and guidance systems. Contin-
ued technical progress made it possible for the United States to fight and win wars more 
quickly and cheaply, from a greater distance and with less risk than ever before, and 
therefore made the U.S. more likely to fight them. It thus rendered unnecessary, or ob-
solete, the post-Vietnam caution that had characterized the thinking of the American 
military. The new openness to the use of force was grasped as early as 1993 by Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright, who during the Bosnian crisis asked of Colin Powell, 
“What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we 
can’t use it?” Similar conclusions would be reached by “neo-conservative” critics, who 
felt that the Clinton administration had failed to follow up on Albright’s insight. A sec-
ond effect of the “revolution” was to make allies less useful, for most possible allies 
would have to fight with more backward equipment and the requirement to coordinate 
with such less well-equipped forces would in practice hamper U.S. tactics, slowing it 
down and in effect neutralizing the advantages bestowed upon it by the latest technol-
ogy. Hence the strictly military incentive for recruiting allies was removed, leaving only 
the political need to legitimize U.S. intervention.  
 
The partial exception to this was Britain, whose investment in military hardware 
and prior close collaboration with the U.S. military made the problem of “interoperabil-
ity” between the two nation’s forces less severe than with other potential allies.89 Indeed, 
the infrastructure of U.S./UK cooperation in matters of intelligence, military planning 
and foreign policy made it possible to coordinate the response to crisis in a way that was 
impossible with and between most other potential allies and this was no doubt an un-
 
89Christopher Coker, “The Anglo-American Defense Partnership,” in Barry Rubin and Thomas 
Keaney, eds., U.S. Allies in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 75-93, suggests that 
Britain is also falling behind the U.S. technologically, though less so than other European coun-
tries. The term used to describe the ability of the two defense establishments to work together is 
“interoperability.” Geoffrey Hoon, the former Defence Minister, is reported to have said that, as 
Jeffrey McCausland reports, “the first principle of British defense planning was to be interopera-
ble with the U.S. forces.”  See McCausland, “When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It….. 
Defence Policy and the Special Relationship,” paper presented to the APSA, Chicago, IL, August 
2007. 
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derlying factor that made the “special relationship” of genuine practical utility. Military 
compatibility was by no means the only reason why Britain supported the U.S. in its 
newly aggressive posture, of course. On the contrary, ready cooperation in war was but 
a reflection of the broader convergence between the U.S. and UK on issues of foreign 
relations, defense and economic policy that had evolved over nearly a quarter century 
and that was by 2001 anchored in, or at least reinforced by, comparable political econo-
mies. It had been confirmed by repeated excursions in the making and maintenance of 
world order in which Britain and the United States found themselves more or less on the 
same side, arguing for much the same policy despite occasional differences, and often 
more or less alone in doing so. George Bush might have frightened those of a more in-
ternationalist persuasion with his open skepticism towards multilateral agreements and 
institutions, but it was after all Tony Blair who in his Chicago speech of 1999 had in-
sisted that the United Nations required fundamental restructuring before it could be 
truly useful; and it was British exhortation that had convinced Clinton to commit U.S. 
troops to Kosovo. Thus the reaction in the UK to Bush’s unilateralist pronouncements in 
early 2001 was muted, if not exactly sympathetic, and British support for the U.S. in the 
aftermath of 9/11 immediate and nearly spontaneous. 
 
The invasions of Afghanistan and then Iraq complicated, then compromised and 
challenged, not only the “special relationship,” but the role of the U.S. and its British ally 
as arbiters of global order. The toppling of the Taliban was widely applauded when it 
happened, but the military campaign that preceded it was genuinely controversial out-
side the United States. The decision to use force was widely considered precipitous and 
dangerous; and the determination of the U.S. and UK to proceed began to erode wider 
diplomatic support. The assertion, not long after, of the right of the United States to en-
gage in preemptive action against potential enemies, elicited still further and more vocal 
criticism.90 The choice to move on to a confrontation with Iraq provoked truly massive 
opposition in Europe and the Arab world. In Britain Blair just barely prevailed in his ef-
fort to win Parliamentary approval for the venture. When the rationale for war collapsed 
with the inability to find “weapons of mass destruction” and when the failure of recon-
struction and the tenacity of the insurgency stripped away the argument from success, 
support for the U.S. action and, in Britain, for continued close cooperation between the 
U.S. and the UK, began to dissipate. “Democracy promotion,” the least self-interested 
and most attractive principle in the new paradigm, has likewise begun to seem more 
and more a fantasy and, as such, less and less compelling as a defense of policy.91   
 
  To date, therefore, the consequences of the turn to force in American and British 
relations with the world have been extremely negative. The invasion of Iraq toppled 
Saddam Hussein but engendered an insurgency and a civil war that have made violence 
and instability the norm in that country for the foreseeable future. The conflict has also 
multiplied the provocations to Islamist militancy and jihadist terror there and elsewhere. 
The Bush administration’s brief attachment to democracy promotion and nation-
building has become an embarrassment for those who supported the idea and a night-
mare for those charged with carrying it out. The Iraq venture has also served effectively 
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to discredit policies of liberal internationalism and arguments for humanitarian inter-
vention. The prospects for peace in the Middle East, never very good, have receded even 
farther and the recent flurry of diplomatic activity is unlikely to bring them forward. 
Failure on the ground on Iraq, and persistent difficulties in Afghanistan, have also iso-
lated the United States and the UK from traditional allies and deprived Anglo-American 
visions and proposals of essential legitimacy. 
 
  What, then, remains of the formula with which Britain and American hoped to 
reshape the world over the past quarter century? Here the evidence is frankly contra-
dictory.92  The U.S. and the UK have surely relearned the lessons of Vietnam and similar 
struggles: it is hard to impose democracy and invaders will be resisted, whatever their 
intentions and however odious the regime they topple. Policymakers and voters have 
clearly begun to absorb this lesson and to move in the direction of what the foreign pol-
icy community regards as “realism.”93 The result will be a shift in U.S./UK strategy 
away from military intervention and back towards efforts at engagement and multilat-
eral diplomacy. Britain and the United States will also, it seems likely, continue to push 
for open markets and expanding trade. To this extent the paradigm guiding the Anglo-
American alliance since the 1980s will be reasserted. 
 
  But what, after Iraq and so much else, are the prospects of it being effective?  If it 
is true that 9/11 did not change everything, as many Americans at first thought, it is also 
the case that the world is rather different than it was in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War or at the turn of the millennium and that the landscape of international rela-
tions and the shape of the global economy have been much altered. Especially important 
has been the faltering in the process of globalization. The “battle of Seattle” at the WTO 
meeting in 1999 has been much celebrated and its significance typically exaggerated, but 
it did indicate that the heroic phase of opening the world to freer trade was ending and 
that the next steps would be harder and that domestic support for taking these steps, 
both in the advanced countries and in the emerging economies, would be difficult to 
maintain. Less than ten days after the destruction of the World Trade Center, U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick called for a strategy of “countering terror with trade”: 
“the terrorists,” he explained, “deliberately chose the World Trade towers as their target. 
While their blow toppled the towers, it cannot and will not shake the foundation of 
world trade and freedom.”94 That optimism seems in retrospect rather mistaken, for the 
environment in which international economic negotiations take place has in fact been 
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transformed, not only by hesitation about the costs and benefits of globalization but be-
cause the strength of the parties involved has changed. The U.S., and the west more gen-
erally, have lost the ability to dictate the terms of a more open world economy. Future 
bargains will inevitably reflect shifts in economic clout, and initiatives aimed at opening 
up trade will most likely be delayed until all sides have taken the full measure of the 
new balance. Equally important, if the broadening of markets was the precondition for 
engagement with international institutions and for the emergence of civil society, then 
the logic of the paradigm guiding U.S./UK policy implies a retreat from that agenda and 
hence, for good or ill, a period of stasis in efforts to export or impose democracy and to 
promote human rights. 
 
The other big and perhaps lasting consequence of the Iraq war has been the par-
allel loss of legitimacy abroad and of domestic support for foreign ventures in both the 
U.S. and the UK. Not only is Anglo-American power no longer so intimidating, but the 
arguments of British and American leaders are not at all as compelling or attractive as 
they were a decade ago. The political will to sustain the Anglo-American position in the 
world may also just not be there. There is certainly far less support for the “special rela-
tionship” in Britain now than in the past and American public opinion has turned deci-
sively against the war in Iraq.95 There is also obvious concern within the U.S. military 
about its ability successfully to carry out extensive and prolonged operations like those 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Criticism from military leaders is inevitably muted, but not en-
tirely absent, in Britain especially, but the adventurism characteristic of Bush and Blair is 
clearly incompatible with maintaining the fighting efficiency, the morale, the prestige 
and public support that the armed forces crave and believe they must have.96 Institu-
tional self-interest alone therefore dictates caution and reinforces public opinion. 
 
On balance, then, it is quite possible that whatever U.S. and U.K. policymakers 
choose to do, they will not be capable of making it happen. The net effect of the changes 
in politics, in the world economy and in international relations that have occurred since 
and largely despite 9/11 – and while attention has been focused on that cataclysmic 
event and the immediate responses to it – may well be that the Anglo-American project 
for creating, by force if necessary, an open and largely peaceful world of market-based 
democracies no longer makes practical or theoretical sense, if it ever did. What hopes 
and visions will take its place truly cannot be envisioned at this point in time. Perhaps 
the best argument for a continuation, and for the continued effectiveness, of the Anglo-
American vision is the absence thus far of a competing alternative. Still, so little of what 
has happened since the 1980s in the sphere of international affairs was predicted that it 
would be foolish to rule out further dramatic shifts or to assume that no alternative vi-
sion is possible. 
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